"philip anselmo" wrote:
Vulnerable Code: *************** include $path_to_calendar."calendar.php";
Looking at the few lines prior to that:
extract($HTTP_GET_VARS);
if(suppressed './data/global.php'){
echo "Can't open ./data/global.php";
exit;
}
extract($PATHS);
include $path_to_calendar."calendar.php";
After successfully running 'install.php', the 'data/global.php' file
will contain something like this:
$PATHS=array(
"path_to_calendar" => "/[blah]/cl_files/",
"path_to_calendar_img" => "/[blah]/cl_files/img/",
"WEB_path_to_calendar_img" => "http://[site]/[blah]/cl_files/img/",
"path_to_data" => "/[blah]/cl_files/data/"
);
The include statement will use "/[blah]/cl_files/" instead of the
user-supplied parameter in $HTTP_GET_VARS.
And, indeed, testing confirms that the static parameter is used and that the reported exploit URL does not work. Systems that have been upgraded from an earlier version in an improper manner may be a different story. Stuart
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